Drill 18 ยท
AP Cybersecurity Drill 18: Shared-Workstation Security Policy is a practice drill. It contains 5 original questions created by Brian Stewart, a Barron's test prep author with over 20 years of tutoring experience.
A practice manager at Sundquist Dental Group compares current and proposed settings for the shared front-desk workstation; this drill uses an invented company and original figures.
The front desk at Sundquist Dental Group uses one shared workstation that several staff sign into during the day. The manager drafts a new policy and lists current versus proposed settings.
| Setting | Current | Proposed |
|---|---|---|
| Account model | One shared login for all staff | Individual login per staff member |
| Screen lock on idle | Never | After 5 minutes |
| Account lockout | None | After 5 failed attempts |
| Multi-factor at login | Off | On |
Question 1. What is the main weakness of the current shared-login account model?
Explanation: Choice D is correct. With one shared login, the logs cannot tell who did what, so individual accountability is lost. Choice A is incorrect. A single shared login means fewer passwords, not separate ones per person. Choice B is incorrect. The current setting never locks on idle, which is part of the problem, not the model's effect. Choice C is incorrect. Multi-factor is currently off, so no phone code is required.
Question 2. Which proposed change most directly limits someone walking up to an unattended, signed-in workstation?
Explanation: Choice B is correct. An idle screen lock blanks and secures the session after inactivity, which is the specific risk of an unattended, already-signed-in machine. Choice A is incorrect. Individual accounts add accountability but do not lock an already open session. Choice C is incorrect. Lockout addresses repeated guessing, not a walk-up to an open session. Choice D is incorrect. Multi-factor protects the login step, not a session already open.
Question 3. Which proposed setting would most help the team detect repeated password-guessing against an account?
Explanation: Choice C is correct. A lockout after several failures both stops the run of bad guesses and records a visible lockout event, giving staff a clear signal that guessing is happening. Choice A is incorrect. Multi-factor blocks misuse but does not by itself highlight a guessing pattern. Choice B is incorrect. An idle lock addresses unattended sessions, not guessing. Choice D is incorrect. Individual logins aid attribution but do not detect repeated failures on their own.
Question 4. Why does adding multi-factor authentication reduce risk even if a staff password is stolen?
Explanation: Choice A is correct. Multi-factor means access requires both the password and a separate factor, so a thief holding only the password still cannot get in. Choice B is incorrect. Multi-factor does not rotate the password on each login. Choice C is incorrect. Multi-factor adds a factor; it does not remove the password. Choice D is incorrect. Ignoring failed logins is not how multi-factor works and would hide attacks.
Question 5. Taken together, which single change best preserves a per-person record of who performed each action?
Explanation: Choice D is correct. Individual accounts tie each logged action to a specific person, restoring the accountability the shared login destroyed. Choice A is incorrect. An idle lock secures sessions but does not attribute actions. Choice B is incorrect. Lockout slows guessing but does not identify who acted. Choice C is incorrect. Multi-factor strengthens login but, on a shared account, still leaves actions unattributed.