Drill 17 ยท
AP Cybersecurity Drill 17: Password Storage and Login Attempts is a practice drill. It contains 5 original questions created by Brian Stewart, a Barron's test prep author with over 20 years of tutoring experience.
An IT admin at Brammel Foundry reviews how account passwords are stored and studies a short login-attempt log; this drill uses an invented company and original figures.
An administrator at Brammel Foundry reviews account security. The login system locks an account after the fifth consecutive failed attempt. The log below shows one morning of attempts on the account jmoreno.
| Time | Result |
|---|---|
| 08:01 | Failed |
| 08:02 | Failed |
| 08:03 | Failed |
| 08:04 | Failed |
| 08:06 | Success |
The system stores each password as a salted one-way hash, never as plain text. The password policy requires at least 12 characters and must include an uppercase letter, a lowercase letter, a digit, and a symbol. A user proposes the password SpringForge2024.
Question 1. How many failed attempts occurred on jmoreno before the successful login?
Explanation: Choice C is correct. The log lists failures at 08:01, 08:02, 08:03, and 08:04, which is four failed attempts, followed by a success at 08:06. Choice A is incorrect. Two undercounts the failed rows shown. Choice B is incorrect. Three also undercounts the failed rows. Choice D is incorrect. Five would have triggered the lockout, but the log shows only four failures and then a success.
Question 2. Did the account reach the lockout threshold during this log?
Explanation: Choice A is correct. The policy locks the account on the fifth consecutive failure, and only four failures occurred before the success, so the threshold was not reached. Choice B is incorrect. A single failure does not lock the account under the stated rule. Choice C is incorrect. The count, not merely the timing, determines lockout, and four is below the limit. Choice D is incorrect. A success can follow failures, which is exactly what the log shows.
Question 3. Why does storing passwords as salted one-way hashes protect users if the database is stolen?
Explanation: Choice D is correct. A one-way hash cannot be feasibly turned back into the original password, and a unique salt per user defeats precomputed lookup tables, so a stolen database does not hand over the passwords. Choice A is incorrect. Salting does not set an expiration on stored passwords. Choice B is incorrect. A hash is a stored value, not an alerting mechanism that emails anyone. Choice C is incorrect. Salting protects stored values, not data moving across the network, which is the job of transport encryption.
Question 4. Which change would most improve protection against someone who guesses jmoreno's password?
Explanation: Choice B is correct. Requiring a second factor means a guessed or stolen password alone is not enough to sign in, which directly addresses password guessing. Choice A is incorrect. Locking on one wrong attempt would constantly lock out legitimate users and invites denial of service. Choice C is incorrect. Plain-text storage removes protection rather than adding it. Choice D is incorrect. Dropping the symbol rule weakens the password instead of strengthening login.
Question 5. Does the proposed password SpringForge2024 satisfy the stated policy?
Explanation: Choice A is correct. SpringForge2024 is fifteen characters with upper-case, lower-case, and digits, but it contains no symbol, so it fails the policy on that one rule. Choice B is incorrect. It does not meet every rule, since the symbol is missing. Choice C is incorrect. At fifteen characters it clears the twelve-character minimum. Choice D is incorrect. Containing a year does not override the symbol requirement.