Drill 2 ยท
AP Cybersecurity Drill 2: Login History and Weak Authentication is a practice drill. It contains 5 original questions created by Brian Stewart, a Barron's test prep author with over 20 years of tutoring experience.
A library staffer reviews an account's login history after a patron reports odd activity and judges what happened; this drill uses an invented company and original figures.
A patron of Tessmer County Library reports that their account looks like someone else used it. The account username is the patron's last name plus a two-digit number, protected by a password only. A staffer pulls the login history.
| Time | Source IP | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 08:12 | 198.51.100.20 | Success |
| 21:03 | 203.0.113.77 | Failed |
| 21:03 | 203.0.113.77 | Failed |
| 21:04 | 203.0.113.77 | Failed |
| 21:04 | 203.0.113.77 | Failed |
| 21:05 | 203.0.113.77 | Failed |
| 21:06 | 203.0.113.77 | Success |
The patron says they logged in once that morning and did nothing in the evening. The morning and evening logins come from different source addresses.
Question 1. How many failed login attempts appear in the log?
Explanation: Choice C is correct. The log shows five rows with Result Failed, all from 203.0.113.77 between 21:03 and 21:05, so the failed-attempt count is five. Choice A is incorrect. Four undercounts the failed rows; there are five. Choice B is incorrect. Six counts one of the successes as a failure. Choice D is incorrect. Seven is the total number of attempts, not the number that failed.
Question 2. The five failures followed quickly by a success from a single new address are most consistent with which kind of attack?
Explanation: Choice A is correct. Several rapid failed logins from one source ending in a success is the pattern of online password guessing, where an attacker tries candidates until one works. Choice B is incorrect. A distributed denial-of-service attack floods a service from many sources to take it offline, not to log in. Choice C is incorrect. Cross-site scripting injects scripts into web pages and does not appear as repeated login failures. Choice D is incorrect. ARP poisoning redirects local network traffic and would not produce this login-failure pattern.
Question 3. Which observation most strongly supports treating the evening activity as unauthorized?
Explanation: Choice B is correct. The evening activity comes from a different source address than the morning login, and the patron says they did nothing that evening, which together point to someone other than the patron. Choice A is incorrect. The time of day alone does not show who was logging in; people use accounts in the evening legitimately. Choice C is incorrect. Password-only protection is a weakness but does not by itself prove the evening user was an imposter. Choice D is incorrect. A first-try success in the morning is consistent with the real patron, not evidence about the evening.
Question 4. Why does the account's password scheme make this attack easier to succeed?
Explanation: Choice A is correct. A last name combined with only a two-digit number yields very few possibilities, so an attacker can run through them quickly until one works. Choice B is incorrect. Including a name does not encrypt anything; encryption is unrelated to how the password is composed. Choice C is incorrect. A two-digit number does not make a password unique and in fact keeps the space small. Choice D is incorrect. Login systems do not automatically reject name-based passwords; the scheme here was allowed and is weak.
Question 5. Which change would most directly prevent a repeat of this specific attack?
Explanation: Choice C is correct. A strong unique password defeats quick guessing, and a second authentication factor blocks an attacker who has only the password, directly stopping this attack. Choice A is incorrect. Restricting login hours does not prevent guessing and burdens the legitimate patron. Choice B is incorrect. Hiding the page from search engines does nothing against an attacker who already reaches the login. Choice D is incorrect. A longer username helps a little but leaves the weak single-factor password as the real opening.