Drill 10 ยท
AP Cybersecurity Drill 10: Wireless Configuration Table is a practice drill. It contains 5 original questions created by Brian Stewart, a Barron's test prep author with over 20 years of tutoring experience.
A network administrator reviews a small business's wireless settings and chooses changes that secure both the staff and guest networks; this drill uses an invented company and original figures.
Tovasco Brewing runs two wireless networks from one access point: a staff network that reaches the point-of-sale system and back-office PCs, and a guest network for customers. The administrator records the current settings.
| Setting | Staff network | Guest network |
|---|---|---|
| Network name (SSID) | Tovasco-Staff | Tovasco-Guest |
| Encryption | WPA2 | Open (none) |
| Password | tovasco2019 | None |
| Can reach point-of-sale system | Yes | Yes |
| Admin page login | admin / admin (factory default) | |
The administrator wants customers to have internet access without being able to reach the point-of-sale system or staff PCs, and wants the staff network protected against easy intrusion.
Question 1. Reading the table, which configuration most directly lets any customer reach the point-of-sale system?
Explanation: Choice C is correct. The guest network requires no password and is configured to reach the point-of-sale system, so any customer who joins it can attempt to reach that system directly. Choice A is incorrect. WPA2 on the staff network is a protection, not the path that exposes the point-of-sale system to guests. Choice B is incorrect. The staff password concerns staff access, not what the open guest network can reach. Choice D is incorrect. Sharing one access point is common; the exposure comes from the guest network being allowed to reach the point-of-sale system, not the shared hardware.
Question 2. Which change best stops guest devices from reaching the point-of-sale system and staff PCs?
Explanation: Choice A is correct. Network isolation that allows guest traffic to the internet but blocks it from the staff segment and point-of-sale system enforces the separation the administrator wants. Choice B is incorrect. Renaming the SSID hides nothing meaningful and does not restrict what the guest network can reach. Choice C is incorrect. Reducing transmit power shrinks coverage but does not prevent a connected guest from reaching the point-of-sale system. Choice D is incorrect. A request relies on customer behavior and does not technically block access.
Question 3. The guest network is open with no encryption. Which change most improves the confidentiality of what guests send over it?
Explanation: Choice D is correct. Turning on WPA3, or WPA2 where WPA3 is unavailable, encrypts traffic between guest devices and the access point, improving confidentiality compared with an open network, though it is not a substitute for HTTPS; providing the password keeps it usable. Choice A is incorrect. Hiding the SSID does not encrypt traffic; an open hidden network is still unencrypted. Choice B is incorrect. A shorter password weakens protection and does not address the lack of encryption. Choice C is incorrect. A one-device limit does not encrypt anyone's traffic.
Question 4. Which entry in the table is the clearest sign that an attacker could take control of the wireless settings themselves?
Explanation: Choice C is correct. A factory-default admin login such as admin / admin is publicly known, so anyone who reaches the admin page can log in and change every wireless setting, which is the clearest path to controlling the configuration. Choice A is incorrect. The staff SSID name is not a credential and does not grant control. Choice B is incorrect. The open guest network is a serious exposure for access to systems but does not by itself hand over the admin console. Choice D is incorrect. Using one access point is a normal design choice, not evidence of admin-level compromise.
Question 5. Considering the whole table, which set of changes best secures both networks?
Explanation: Choice B is correct. Replacing the default admin login and the weak staff password with strong unique ones, encrypting the guest network, and isolating guests together fix the admin exposure, the easy-to-guess staff access, the open guest traffic, and the guest path to the point-of-sale system. Choice A is incorrect. Logging out at night leaves the default admin login, weak password, open guest network, and guest reachability untouched. Choice C is incorrect. Giving customers the staff password puts guests directly onto the sensitive network, the opposite of isolation. Choice D is incorrect. A stronger staff password helps, but it leaves the factory-default admin login, the open guest network, and the guest path to the point-of-sale system unaddressed.