Drill 30 ยท
AP Cybersecurity Drill 30: Incident Triage Across Defenses is a practice drill. It contains 5 original questions created by Brian Stewart, a Barron's test prep author with over 20 years of tutoring experience.
Carnby Freight Lines triages a possible intrusion using an authentication log, an account-lockout policy, and a firewall change record from the same evening; this drill uses an invented company and original figures.
Carnby Freight Lines -- incident triage (dispatch server)
Source 1 -- authentication log for account jvargas
| Time | Account | Result |
|---|---|---|
| 22:01 | jvargas | Failed |
| 22:01 | jvargas | Failed |
| 22:02 | jvargas | Failed |
| 22:02 | jvargas | Failed |
| 22:03 | jvargas | Failed |
| 22:03 | jvargas | Failed |
| 22:04 | jvargas | Success |
Source 2 -- account-lockout policy
An account is locked for 15 minutes after 8 consecutive failed sign-ins. The counter resets to zero on any successful sign-in.
Source 3 -- firewall change record (same evening)
22:06 added: ALLOW any -> port 3389 (remote desktop)
The change was made from the jvargas session and was not requested through the normal change process.
Question 1. How many failed sign-in attempts for jvargas appear in the log before the successful one?
Explanation: Choice D is correct. The log lists six rows marked Failed for jvargas, then a seventh row marked Success, so six failures precede the success. Choice A is incorrect because four undercounts the failed rows. Choice B is incorrect because five also undercounts by one. Choice C is incorrect because seven counts the success row as a failure; only six rows are failures.
Question 2. Using the lockout policy, why did the account never lock during this sequence?
Explanation: Choice A is correct. The policy locks an account after 8 consecutive failures, but only six occurred before a success, which then reset the counter to zero, so the threshold was never reached. Choice B is incorrect because the policy states no business-hours limitation. Choice C is incorrect because the log shows the account was reachable and the attempts were recorded, not blocked by an existing lock. Choice D is incorrect because the log attributes all attempts to the same account, and the policy counts consecutive failures regardless of source.
Question 3. Reading all three sources together, what does the sequence of events most likely indicate?
Explanation: Choice D is correct. Repeated failures ending in a success point to a guessed or cracked password, and the same session then added a broad remote-desktop allow rule outside the change process, which together read as an intrusion. Choice A is incorrect because a routine change would not be preceded by six failed sign-ins or skip the change process. Choice B is incorrect because a backup job would use stored credentials, not produce a burst of failures. Choice C is incorrect because an outage would not explain the deliberate, unrequested firewall change from that session.
Question 4. Which single record detail most strongly signals that the successful sign-in should be treated as malicious rather than routine?
Explanation: Choice A is correct. Opening remote desktop to any source right after the successful sign-in, without going through the change process, is the action that marks the session as hostile rather than a normal login. Choice B is incorrect because the late hour is mildly suspicious but is not itself evidence of malice. Choice C is incorrect because an unclear account name is a naming concern, not evidence about this session. Choice D is incorrect because the lockout duration describes policy and says nothing about whether this sign-in was malicious.
Question 5. Considering defense in depth, which response best contains this incident across more than one layer?
Explanation: Choice C is correct. A layered response addresses each affected control: resetting the compromised credentials and terminating the active session close the access path, removing the unauthorized rule restores the firewall, and reviewing recent activity checks for further damage. Choice A is incorrect because resetting the password while leaving the rogue firewall rule in place ignores a second layer that is already weakened. Choice B is incorrect because leaving a likely-compromised session active to observe it risks further harm. Choice D is incorrect because tightening the lockout threshold is a useful hardening step but does nothing about the access already gained or the firewall change.